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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

THE STATE OP UTAH

I

Plaintiff-Respondent, i
v.

LEON EARL DENNEY,

t

Case No. 880371-CA

t

Priority No. 2

t

Defendant-Appellant, t

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from an order of the Fifth District
Court of Iron County, State of Utah, denying defendant's Motion
to Terminate Probation Nunc Pro Tunc and revoking defendant's
probation and committing him to the Utah State Prison for two
concurrent terms of sero to five years for two third degree
felony offenses of Uttering a Forged Prescription.

As the

underlying crimes were third degree felonies, jurisdiction lies
in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether defendant's appeal should be dismissed for
failure of his brief to comply with the procedural requirements
for perfection of an appeal as set forth in Rule 24(a)(7) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

2.

Whether the trial court was correct in sentencing

defendant to two consecutive eighteen month terms of probation,
notwithstanding Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1982)(Supp. 1988).
3.

Whether defendant, by requesting a probationary

term of three years in lieu of a prison sentence, waived his
right to a possible earlier statutory probation termination,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1(7)(a) (1982)(Supp. 1988),
and/or whether defendant should now be estopped from alleging as
error that which he himself requested of the court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on:
1)

Rule 24(a)(7),(9) of the Rules of the Utah Court of

Appeals,
2)

Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1 (1982)(Supp. 1988),

3)

Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201 (1978)(Supp. 1988), and

4)

Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-401 (1978)

The full text of these provisions are attached in the Addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 18, 1985, defendant, Leon Earl Denney,
pled guilty to two third degree felony offenses of Uttering a
Forged Prescription in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert F. Owens, Associated
District Judge, sitting by appointment, presiding.

Defendant was

sentenced by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Associated District
Judge, sitting by appointment, on March 20, 1986 to two
concurrent terms of zero to five years at the Utah State
Penitentiary.

At defendant's request, the execution of his
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prison term was suspended or stayed and he was placed on
probation for a period of three years (two consecutive 18-month
terms).
On May 17, 1988, following an Order to Show Cause
Hearing wherein defendant was found to be in violation of his
probation agreement, his probation was revoked and the original
sentence imposed.

This is an appeal from the order revoking the

defendant's probation and sentencing him to two concurrent terms
of zero to five years in the Utah State Penitentiary for two
counts of Uttering a Forged Prescription.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 20, 1986, after pleading guilty to two counts
of Uttering a Forged Prescription, defendant was sentenced to
serve two concurrent terms of zero to five years at the Utah
State Penitentiary by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, sitting as
District Judge by assignment (Transcript of the Sentencing
Hearing held March 19, 1986 [hereinafter T.3/19/86] at 41.)
After a lengthy hearing at which defendant and his counsel argued
strenuously against commitment to prison, Judge Eves suspended or
stayed the execution of the prison term.

At the express request

of defendant through his counsel (See Defense Counsel's
Recommendation, R. at 26, attached in the Addenda), defendant was
placed on an extended term of three-years probation under the
intensive supervision of Adult Probation and Parole (T.3/19/86 at
41).

The three year term of probation was a combination of two

eighteen-month probationary terms upon conviction of two third
degree felony offenses, running consecutively (Transcript of
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Hearing on Motion to Terminate Probation held May 17, 1988
[hereinafter T.5/17/88} at 6.)

The granting of probation was

contingent upon defendant's compliance with the terms of his
probation agreement, which defendant indicated that he understood
(T.3/19/86 at 41-43).

On April 12 1988, during defendant's

continuing probation, Judge Eves issued an Order to Show Cause,
ordering defendant to appear and show why his probation should
not be revoked on the allegations that defendant had been
arrested for Driving Under the Influence in the State of Nevada,
and that defendant had committed credit card fraud (See copy of
the allegations of the Order to Show Cause, R. at 62-65,
attached in the Addenda).

On May 17, 1988, defendant's probation

was revoked and the original concurrent sentences of zero to five
years were imposed, upon a finding by the court that defendant
had consumed alcohol and was driving under the influence,
(Transcript of the Order to Show Cause Hearing held May 17, 1988
[hereinafter T. OSC 5/17/88] at 7), and had knowingly furnished
false information to obtain a credit card; each of which was in
violation of the specific terms of defendant's probation
agreement (T. OSC 5/17/88 at 37). Defendant has since been
convicted and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the credit
card fraud.

That conviction is currently on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
FAILURE OF HIS BRIEF TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFECTING AN
APPEAL AS SET FORTH IN RULE 24(a)(7) OF
THE RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 24(a)(7) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
provides in part# "[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain
under appropriate headings and in the order here indicated . . .
(7) . . . All statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record
(See Paragraph (3)).H (emphasis added)
is clear and unambiguous.

The language of the Rule

It's purpose, if only in part, is to

verify and/or clarify the information found in the brief and to
forestall the court and respondent having to examine and search
the entire record for the specific reference cited by defendant.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740
P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987), speaking of Rule 24(a)(7) of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court which is identical to Rule 24(a)(7) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, stated "If counsel on appeal
does not provide adequate citations to the record, the judgment
of the lower court is presumed to be correct.- Id. at 1319.
[citing Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, (Utah 1987); and State v.
Tucker, 657 P,2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982).]
Defendant's short Statement of Facts makes no specific
citations to the record but in lieu thereof states, "[r]ather
than making citations to the record on appeal, this writer is
attaching the pertinent orders of the trial court as the addendum
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of this brief." (Brief of Appellant at 4).
provide for an alternative.

The statute does not

Further, defendant's Argument is

also bare of the references required under Rule 24(a)(9).

The

procedural requirements as set forth under the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeal8 in order to perfect an appeal have not been
sufficiently complied with; therefore the judgment of the lower
court should be presumed to be correct and this appeal dismissed.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO TWO CONSECUTIVE
TERMS OF PROBATION.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1(7)(a)(1982)(Supp. 1988)
provides:
Upon completion without violation of 18
month's probation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B
misdemeanor cases, the probation period shall
be terminated, unless earlier terminated by
the court.
There is no dispute that under this section a
probationary term of more than eighteen months, for a single
felony conviction, would in most cases be considered an abuse of
discretion.

There is provision in Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1(7)(c)

for an extension of probation in certain circumstances upon
notice and hearing or waiver of notice and hearing by defendant.
Nonetheless, contrary to the assertion of defendant, neither this
section, nor the recent case of State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462
(Utah 1988), dispose of the present issue.

The issue here is

whether the trial court can sentence an individual to two
consecutive terms of probation when each term is comprised of the
18-month statutory period.

If the court can impose such
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consecutive terms of probation, then defendant's probation was
properly revoked during the second, consecutive, term of his
probation.
Though an order of consecutive sentences of probation
is unusual, it can be read consistently with state law and public
policy.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201 (1978)(Supp. 1988) provides

that the Court may sentence a person Mto any one of the following
sentences or combination of them: (a) to pay a fine; (b) to
removal from or disqualification of public or private office; (c)
to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; (d)
to imprisonment or; (e) to death." (emphasis added) A sentence
can run either concurrently or consecutively. See Utah Code Ann.
S 76-3-401 (1978); See also State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417 (Utah
1987) ("It lies within the discretion of the trial court to
impose sentences or a combination of sentences which may include
payment of a fine, restitution, probation, or imprisonment." Ld.
at 420); State v. Shelby, 726 P.2d 987 (Utah 1986).

The

foregoing statutes, when read together, appear to allow
consecutive terms of probation.

Further, the Utah Supreme Court

in State v. Garcia, 504 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1972) stated:
...the trial court in a criminal prosecution
is granted wide discretion in dealing with
the defendant after he is convicted, and the
statutes grant to the trial court wide powers
other than pronouncing the sentence provided
by law. The court may in its discretion
place a defendant on probation on whatever
conditions it deems proper.
Id. at 1016.

The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the

purpose of allowing probation is to "provide an opportunity for
reformation." State v. Bonza, 150 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah 1944); See
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also State v. Zolantakisf 259 P. 1044 (Utah 1927).

Since the

time required for reformation differs from individual to
individual, depending on such circumstances as the criminal
conduct, past behavior and so forth, consecutive sentences of
probation for multiple crimes is, in certain circumstances,
consistent with and necessary to achieve the underlying purpose
of probation of allowing sufficient time for reformation.
The States which have addressed this question have
placed limits on consecutive sentences of probation.

The reasons

for such limits were not the same for all the states, but for
several different reasons which are not necessarily applicable to
this state's policy.

The reasons given by those courts which

have limited consecutive sentences of probation can be separated
for the most part into three distinct groups.

First, some of the

states have adopted a statutory probation limit of five years,
and believe that rehabilitation will occur, if ever, within that
time.

The Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Angle, 353 N.W.2d 421,

425 (Iowa 1984), held that the trial court had erred in ordering
two consecutive five-year periods of probation.

Iowa state law

provided that the length of probation would be for a term fixed
by the trial court but could not exceed five years for a felony
offense.

The defendant had argued that the Iowa legislature had

not indicated•that the maximum length of probation should be
extended as a result of the length of possible incarceration.
That state's Supreme Court accepted the defendant's theory
although it said that the issue was not free from doubt.

They

held that the statute limiting the total probationary term to

-ft.

five years was consistent with the belief of correctional
authorities that "rehabilitation will occur within five years or
not at all.

See J. Yeager 6 R. Carlson, Criminal Law and

Procedure S 1731, at 377-78 (1979).M

Id at 425. Apparently, in

Iowa the trial court could have imposed consecutive probationary
terms for separate offenses but only if the total probationary
time did not exceed the five year maximum.
In State v. Gonzales, 608 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1980), the
defendant challenged the legality of his sentence in which he was
given consecutive probationary terms which totaled ten years.
The Alaska statute provided that probationary periods in that
state, including extensions, could not exceed five years. Again,
apparently consecutive terms could be imposed but only if the
total amount of time on probation did not exceed five years.
The Maryland Court of Appeals in State v. Oliver, 490
A.2d 242, (Md. Ct. App. 1985), cited Maryland law which is that
confinement can be ordered with the remainder of the sentence
suspended and the defendant placed on probation.

The

probationary period can be for a period longer than the sentence
but not in excess of five years. The Court of Appeals held that
the trial court could not grant probation for a period to run
consecutively to any other period of probation if the total of
the probationary periods exceeded five years.

Evidently, a grant

of consecutive probationary periods would be acceptable if the
total term did not exceed five years.

In 1985, when this opinion

was written, federal law, the law of fifteen states and the
Virgin Islands contained a similar five-year limitation on
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probationary periods.

Two states allowed probation to be set at

the discretion of the judge, two limited the probationary period
to the maximum term authorized for the crime and two expressly
required concurrent probationary periods. See Id. at 252.
The second category of reason for limiting consecutive
probationary periods is that there was no longer a statutory
provision which would allow a trial court to "stack" probationary
periods.

In State v. Gereaux, 338 N.W.2d 118 (Wis. Ct. App.

1983), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
trial court with directions that the probation on defendant's
second count must run concurrently with the first count.

The

1965 version of Wisconsin's statute regarding probation had
expressly provided that periods of probation could be imposed
consecutively.

The law had been revised prior to the Gereaux

case and reference to consecutive probationary periods had been
omitted.

In that factual setting, the appellate court held that

the trial court erred in imposing consecutive probationary
periods.

The fact that the earlier statute had made express

reference to consecutive probation but that the language had then
been omitted by the legislature when revising the statute led the
court to conclude that consecutive probationary periods were no
longer permitted in Wisconsin.
Finally, in some states there exists a specific
statutory directive forbidding use of consecutive probationary
periods.

In People v. Tedford, 445 N.E.2d 841, (111. Ct. App.

1983), the Second District Appellate Court of Illinois held that
the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to consecutive
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periods of probation.

Illinois law mandated that multiple terms

of probation imposed at the same time must run concurrently based
on the language of the statute.
Utah law does not expressly provide for nor forbid the
use of consecutive probationary periods as do some other states.
As stated above, Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201 (1978)(Supp. 1988)
allows a court to sentence a defendant to probation.

Section 76-

3-401 (1978)(Supp. 1988) mandates that, if a defendant has pled
guilty to more than one felony offense, the court shall determine
whether the sentences will be imposed concurrently or
consecutively.

Provision for the termination or the extension of

probationary periods are contained in Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1
(1982)(Supp. 1988).

Subsection (7)(a) says that a felony

probation will terminate at the conclusion of eighteen months if
there are no violations of the probationary conditions.
Subsection (7)(c) provides that, at any time prior to the
termination of the probation, upon notice and hearing or upon
waiver of the notice and hearing by the probationer, the court
has the option to extend probation for an additional 18-month
term if fines or restitution are still owing.

Subsection (9)(a)

provides that probation may be modified or extended upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding
in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of
probation.

The respondent maintains, as contained in Point III

A, that defendant has waived his right to a hearing as
contemplated in Subsection (9)(a).
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The reasons advanced by the state courts which have
previously addressed this issue, though valid, appear not
specifically applicable to the statutes and policy of this State.
Though Utah law does not specifically forbid nor expressly
provide for the use of consecutive probationary periods, such use
may be implied by the statutory provisions that the term
N

sentenceN includes probation and that a sentence can be imposed

either concurrently or consecutively.

Further, unlike those

states which have adopted a five-year (60-month) maximum
probationary period, in this state the language of the statute
allows for an automatic termination at the end of eighteen months
if the court does not modify or extend the period under the
provisions of Subsections (7) or (9). The Utah statute does not
have any language which specifically limits a total probationary
period to a specific term as do the other states, which expressly
limit the period to no more than five years.

For the most part,

it has been held in those states adopting the five-year limit
that rehabilitation will occur within five years or not at all.
Based on that theory of rehabilitation, those states have limited
the time during which a defendant can show that he has been
rehabilitated.

If during the five years of probation the

individual has not shown that he or she can conform his or her
behavior to the law, probation can be revoked and incarceration
imposed.

If, on the other hand, the individual can now conform

to the law, probation can appropriately be terminated.

Though

rehabilitation/reformation is similarly the goal of this state,
the Utah legislature has not as directly addressed the theory
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that rehabilitation will occur within five years.

The fact that

the legislature has allowed for automatic termination of
probation after eighteen months, barring a modification or
extension as provided for in the statute, does not necessarily
mean that the legislature felt that rehabilitation would be
completed within that period.

The legislature did not specify a

maximum time beyond which a probationary period could not be
extended as did other state legislatures.

The fact that the

legislature provided for a means to extend a probationary term
and did not set an express limit beyond which a term could not be
extended argues that consecutive probationary terms do not
violate the legislative intent behind the probation.
The legislature has spoken on a limit imposed on the
courts when imprisonment is involved.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-

401(4) (1978) mandates that consecutive sentences cannot order an
aggregate minimum sentence of more than twelve years'
imprisonment and an aggregate maximum sentence of more than
thirty years' imprisonment, unless the crime authorizes a death
penalty or life imprisonment.

However, this does not address the

probationary time limits.
Defendant was placed on probation on March 20, 1986,
for a period of three years (R. at 40-46).

In view of his prior

record and the circumstances involved in the case, the trial
court was strongly considering a commitment to the Utah State
Penitentiary (T.3/19/86 at 39). In an effort to avoid such
confinement, defendant requested an extended term of three-years
probation (See Defense Counsel's Recommendations in the Addenda,
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R. at 26 and T.3/19/86 at 21). The intent was that the 18-month
term of probation for each third degree felony conviction would
run consecutively, thus resulting in a three-year term of
probation (T.5/17/88 at 6-7). The imposition of the consecutive
sentences was justified once the court considered the gravity and
circumstances of the offense and the history, character and
rehabilitative needs of defendant, even though the offenses may
have been addressed at the same arraignment.
§ 76-3-401(2) (1978).

See Utah Code Ann.

The three year probation did not exceed

the original sentence of imprisonment of zero to five years on
each count, or the maximum period of probation of eighteen months
per felony conviction, nor did the probationary sentence exceed
the consecutive sentence limitation provided under Utah Code Ann.
S 76-3-401(4) (1978).
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-401(1) (1978) provides, in part,
that M. . . sentences shall run concurrently unless the court
states, in the sentence, that they shall run consecutively."

The

state concedes that in the sentencing hearing in the present case
there is no express reference by the court for the implementation
of consecutive sentences.

Nonetheless, defendant expressly

requested the three-year term of probation, which the trial court
later said was intended to be two consecutive 18-month terms (R.
at 26). The purpose of S 76-3-401(1) is to avoid ambiguity in
the sentence.

Here the consecutive probation sentence totaling

three years was requested by defendant and evidence thereof is
present in the record.

Therefore the requirement of § 76-3-
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401(1) should be deemed satisfied or in the alternative should be
deemed waived, due to the express request by defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, respondent maintains that
consecutive sentences of probation are consistent with and valid
under state law.

Therefore the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by revoking defendant's probation upon sufficient
evidence of a violation thereof, and reinstating the original
sentence pursuant to the court's authority under Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-1(9)(c) (1982)(Supp. 1988).

The trial court's decision

terminating defendant's probation should be affirmed.
POINT III
DEFENDANT BY EXPRESSLY REQUESTING A THREE
YEAR TERM OF PROBATION IN LIEU OF A PRISON
SENTENCE WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A POSSIBLE
EARLIER STATUTORY TERMINATION OF PROBATION
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN- S 77-18-1(7)(a)
(1982)(Supp. 1988), AND/OR IS ESTOPPED FROM
ALLEGING AS ERROR THAT WHICH HE SPECIFICALLY
REQUESTED OF THE COURT.
A.

Waiver

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right.

See Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430 (Utah 1983).

Waiver

has been found to have been made either expressly or by
implication at many different stages of a criminal proceeding.
See State v. Tuttle, 399 P.2d 580 (Utah 1965) (defendant's
presentation of evidence to the jury, coupled with no prior
motion to suppress, constituted waiver of alleged illegal search
and seizure of evidence); State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah
1975) (Waiver of right to trial by jury may be made in a capital
case); State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978) (Upon plea of
guilty defendant waived any claim of error by policeman, in
-15-

application for arrest warrant, that defendant had been
identified as murderer); State v. Sydallf 433 P. 2d 10 (Utah 1967)
(Waiver of right to preliminary examination).

As a general

proposition, rights granted by statute or by the state or federal
Constitution may be waived. See 28 Am.Jur.2d § 163 (1966)(Supp.
1988); See also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965); and
Palmer v. Broadbent, 260 P.2d 581 (Utah 1953) (person for whose
benefit statutory provision was enacted may waive provision if
rights of others are not affected)
There is evidence in the record that, at the time of
defendants'8 sentencing, he, by and through his attorney,
expressly requested a three-year term of probation in lieu of a
prison sentence (R. at 26).

The court accepted the probationary

term of three years as the combined two eighteen-month terms for
each third degree felony conviction to be served consecutively
(T.3/17/88 at 6). By requesting and stipulating to the threeyear term, defendant either expressly or impliedly waived any
right of probation termination under S 77-18-1(7)(a) after
eighteen months of violation-free probation.
Defendant cites in his brief the Utah Supreme Court
decision of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)
contending (at least it appears) that defense counsel's request
for a three-year probation on behalf of defendant was not a
sufficient waiver to bind defendant.
persuasive.

This is simply un-

The Gibbons case involved the requirement that the

trial court assure itself and make a record that defendant fully
understood the rights he was relinquishing when he entered a
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guilty plea.

In that case the record was silent as to whether

the defendant understood the elements of the crimes to which he
was pleading guilty.

In the present case it is clear on the

record that defendant knew that the trial judge was strongly
leaning toward sending him to prison for the offenses to which he
pled guilty (T.3/19/86 at 39).

The sentencing record is replete

with instances where defendant presented arguments which were
obviously intended to persuade the court to allow him probation
rather than to incarcerate him (T.3/19/86 at 17-20, 25-34).
Granted, the recommendation found at page 26 of the Record is
entitled "Defense Counsel's Recommendations", but defendant
obviously agreed to the recommendation if it would keep him from
being sent to prison.

At the conclusion of the lengthy

sentencing hearing, the trial court, on the record, placed
defendant on probation for a period of three years under the
provisions of the intensive supervision program by the Department
of Adult Probation and Parole (T.3/19/86 at 41).

After

enumerating the conditions of probation the court addressed
defendant asking if he had any questions or misunderstood any of
the provisions of the sentence.

To that, defendant answered no

(T.3/19/86 at 43). At no time did defendant object to the
imposition of a three-year probation.

Respondent maintains that

by answering the court as defendant did, he waived his right to
notice and hearing for purposes of modifying or extending
probation under S 77-18-1(7)(c) or (9)(a).

Defendant's request

to the Court constituted an express or implied waiver of his
right to automatic termination of probation after eighteen

-17-

months.

Defendant stated that he understood the requirements for

his probation.

Whether this waiver came directly through him or

through his attorney does not or should not affect the validity
of the waiver.

Defendant had the right to waive this statutory

right and it was very beneficial to do so in light of the
impending prison sentence.

Therefore the court did not abuse its

discretion in sentencing defendant to three-years probation nor
in revoking that probation even after the first eighteen months
had passed.
B.

Estoppel

The Utah Supreme has held in State v. Aikers# 51 P.2d
1052 (Utah 1935), that ". . . a party cannot assign as error a
ruling which he has himself induced the court to make." JId. at
1058.

If, in fact, the court was in error in sentencing

defendant to three-years probation upon his conviction for two
third degree felonies, defendant is estopped from assigning as
error that ruling, for it was he himself who requested and
induced the court to make the ruling (R. at 26).
At the time that defendant was placed on probation for
a period of three years, the court, in view of defendant's prior
record and circumstances involved in the case was strongly
considering a commitment to the Utah State Prison.

In an effort

to avoid such a commitment, defendant requested, inter alia, an
extended term of probation.

The intent was that the 18-month

term of probation for each third degree felony conviction would
run consecutively, rather than concurrently, thus resulting in a
three year term of probation.
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In Webster v. Jones# 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978), a
plaintiff who had been convicted of drunk driving and placed on
probation filed a habeas corpus proceeding to restrain a city
court from revoking his probation after he was arrested for
burglary.

He claimed that the original conviction was defective

because the city judge had found that he was not indigent and the
judge would not appoint counsel for him.

The Utah Supreme Court

held with regard to estoppel,
. . . we think it should be discordant to any
one's sense of fairness and justice, as it is
our own, for a person to accept a judgment
which places him on probation during good
behavior, enjoy the benefits thereof until
his misconduct justifies revocation of the
probation, then attempt to revert back and
attack the judgment. The principle of
estoppel is not usually spoken of as applying
in the criminal law, but the principle of
fairness and good conscience pervades
throughout the law, and this plaintiff,
having enjoyed the benefit of the judgment so
long as it favored him, should not in good
conscience be allowed to turn about and
complain thereof.
Id. at 530-531.

The situation in Webster and the situation in

the present case are very much alike. As in Webster, defendant
here received the benefit of being placed on probation, later
violated that probation, and now seeks to attack the original
term of probation after being found in violation of that
probation.

As indicated by the Supreme Court, a defendant should

not be allowed in the name of fairness and justice to accept
probation during good behavior, enjoy the benefits thereof,
commit misconduct calling for a revocation of probation, then
attack the previous ruling placing him on probation.

19-

As the Court in Webster indicated, estoppel is not
usually spoken of as applying in the criminal law, nonetheless,
the principle has been used many times in the courts of this
state during criminal proceedings. See State v. Knill, 656 P.2d
1026 (Utah 1982) (Defendant waived preliminary hearing then asked
for remand for a hearing to be held; on appeal he was estopped
from objecting to the timeliness of the hearing); State v. Danks,
418 P.2d 488 (Utah 1966) (Defendant discharged retained and
appointed counsel; he was precluded on appeal from complaining
about lack of counsel); State v, Neal, 262 P.2d 756 (Utah 1953)
(Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal and then a Motion for a
Rehearing of Motion for a New Trial; the Motion was heard and
denied.

Defendant was precluded on appeal from claiming as error

that the trial court lacked jurisdiction after the Notice of
Appeal was filed).
In the present case defendant should be estopped from
requesting the trial court to act in a certain way because it is
beneficial to him, and then later, after he himself causes the
benefits of the court's action to cease, attacking that same
action.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondent asks this Court to
affirm the revocation of defendant's probation.

DATED this

•4 day

\f

of January, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

•^mgvs.s

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney
J General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

RuleS4

MftJB OF THB UTAH OOUKT OP APPEALS

Rule 14. Briefs.
(a) Brief of appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under ap*
propriate headings and in the order here indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except what
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parti*
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately
inside the oover.
(2) A table of contents with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of this court and describing the nature of the proceedings below.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative, set out verbatim with the
appropriate citation. If a pertinent part of a quotation is lengthy, the
citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be act
forth as provided in Paragraph (f) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the
court below. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the
issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see Paragraph (3)).
(8) A summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the
heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefor,
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied
on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(b) Brief of respondent The brief of the respondent shall conform to the
requirements of Paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the
issues or of the case need not be made unless the respondent is dissatisfied
with the statement of the appellant.
.(c) Reply brief. I t o appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
respondent, and if the respondent has cross-appealed, the respondent may file
a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the
cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set
fcrth in the opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of
eourt
(d) References In briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant- and "respondent* R promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the district court, jurenfle court, or circuit court or in the

THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-1S-1.

77-18-2.

Section
Suspension of sentence — Probe- 77-1S-3.
tion — Supervision — Preeen- 77-18-6.5.
tence investigation — Confidentist — Terms —> Restitution
— Extension or revocation — 77-18-6
Hearings.
Expungement and seeling of
records.

Disposition of fines.
Judgment of desth — Defendant
lo select method — Time of se~
lection.
Judgment to pay line or leatitulion constitutes a lien.

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Confidential
— Terms — Restitution — Extension or revocation — Hearings.
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence end
place the defendant on probation. Supervised probation by the department may not be imposed by the court in cases of class C misdemeanors or
infractions. The jurisdiction of all probationers referred to the Department of Corrections is vested in the court having jurisdiction; custody is
with the Department of Corrections.
(b) The legal custody of all probationers not referred to the department
is vested as ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the defendant. The
court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, and other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to determine what level
of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment
prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections.
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department
standards.
(4) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or information from other
sources about the defendant. The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of
restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report are confidential and
not available except for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council and for use by the Department of Corrections. At the time of
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant or
the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony or information shall be presented in open court on
record and in the presence of the defendant.
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following.
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
tf) eerve a term of koine confinement;

(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance
with Subsections 76-3*201 (S) and (4).
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible for the collection of fines
and restitution during the probation period in cases where the court orders
supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice
of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place the order
on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The
order is considered a legal judgment under which the victim may seek civil
remedy.
(7) (a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months' probation in felony
or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor
eases, the probation period shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated
by the court.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court
and prosecuting attorney in writing 45 days in advance in all cases where
termination of supervision will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines and restitution orders.
(c) At any time prior to the termination of probation, upon a minimum
of five days' notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and
bearing by the probationer, the court may extend probation for an additional term of 18 months in felony or class A misdemeanors or six months
in class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both are owing.
(8) (a) All time served without violation while on probation applies to service of the total term of probation but does not eliminate the requirement
of serving 18 consecutive months without violation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, or six consecutive months without violation in class
B misdemeanor cases. Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior
to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward
the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing
to revoke the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute
service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is
exonerated at the hearing.
(b) When any probationer, without authority from the court or the
Department of Corrections, absents himselffromthe state, or avoids or
evades probation supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or evasion
tolls the probation period.
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the courtfromdischarging a probationer at any time, at the discretion of the court.
(9) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (7Kc) of this chapter [section], probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing
by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. Probation may not
be revoked except upon a hearing in court and afindingthat the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facta asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court
which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extenaion of probation is justified. If the court determines that there is probable
cause, it shall cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked,
modified, or extended.
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
hearing The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to
present evidence.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. The peraons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are

dant unless the courtforgood cause otherwise orders. The defendant may
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence,
(e) After hearing, the court shall makefindingsoffset. Upon a finding
that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may
order the probation revoked, modified, (or] continued, or that the entire
probation term commence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for *willfui
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 623, U.S.C.A. 1985.

CHAPTER 3
PUNISHMENTS
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2. Sentencing
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PART 2
SENTENCING
Section
76-3-201.

Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes
with mandatory sentences.
7*4-201.1. Nonpayment of fine or restitution
as contempt — Imprisonment
— Relief where default not contempt — Collection of default.
W3-201.2. Civil action by victim for

Section
76-3-202.

764-203.

76-3-207.

Paroled persons — Termination
or discharge from sentence —
Time served on parole — Discretion of board of pardons
Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment —
Increase of sentence if firearm
Capital felony — Sentencing pro-

76*3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions —
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of
crimes with mandatory sentences.
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment; or
(e) to death.
(2) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to
forfeit property, dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit
removal of a personfromoffice, dte for contempt, or impose any other civil
penalty. A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(8) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or
victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, is
convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by
the defendant to the sentencing court unless the court in applying the
criteria in Subsection (8Kb) finds that restitution is inappropriate.
Whether the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of

Chapter SO, Title 77, or has been transported at governmental expensefromone county to another within the state for the purpose of
resolving pending criminal charges, and is a4judged guilty of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court
may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the
defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental
entity for the extradition or transportation. In determining whether
restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in
Subsection (8Kb). If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision
a part of the court record. The court shall send a copy of its order of
restitution to the Division of Finance,
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution
which is complete, partial, or nominal, the court shall take into account:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate,
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full
hearing on the issue.
(4) As used in Subsection (3):
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such
as earnings and medical expenses.
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including insured damages.
(d) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(5) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall be guided by sentencing rules regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Judicial Council.
(6) (a) If a defendant subject to Subsection (5) has been sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the
date of commitment on He own motion, or at any time upon the recom-

he had not previously bean sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no
greater than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute. The resentencing provided for in this section shall
comply with the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. Credit
shall be given for time served.
(b) The oourt shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the
record at the time of sentencing. The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sentence that if the defendant is released from prison,
he may be on parole for a period of ten years.
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping,
rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse
of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and
if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by
the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant
ahall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This
subsection supersedes any conflicting provision of law.

Parti
Limitations and Special Provisions on Sentenoes
T6-3-401. Concurrent or ooniecntive sentenoei—Limitations.—(1) Subject to the limitations of subsections (2) through (5), a court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony
offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences shall run concurrently unless the court states, in the
sentence, that they shsll run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(8) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode as defined in section 76-1-401.
(4) If a court lawfully determined to impose consecutive sentences,
the aggregate minimum of all sentences imposed may not exceed twelve
years* imprisonment and the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed
may not exceed thirty years' imprisonment. However, this limitation does
not apply if an offense for which defendant is sentenced authorizes the
death penalty or life imprisonment
(5) The limitation in subsection (4) applies:
(a) If a defendant is sentenced at the same time for more than one
offense;
(b) If a defendant is sentenced at different times for one or more
offenses, all of which were eommitted prior to imposition of sentence for
any one or more of them;
(e) If a defendant has already been sentenced by a court of this state
ether than the present sentencing court or by a court of another state or
federal jurisdiction,
(•) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner
in which they shall be served, the board of pardons shall treat the defendant as though he has been eommitted for a single term with the following
incidents,
(a) The prison term shell consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms; and
(b) The minimum term, if any, shsll constitute the aggregate of the
validly imposed minimum terms*
(7) Whenever a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run
eoncurrently with the ether or with a sentence presently being served, the
lesser sentence shsll merge fasto the greater and the greater shall be the
term to be served, and in the «r*nt nf #nn*1 u n t < n ^ #)**« •v.n MAMM i_« M

ADDENDUM B

DEFENSE COUNSEL'S

RECOMMENDATION

One (1) year in the Iron County Jail;
A fine of $2,000.00 to be paid within the one year;
A work release from the Jail, from 6:00 A.M. until
8:00 P.M., to work and support himself and his family;
Payment of $50.00 per month for his housing in the jail
negating any expense to the State;
Mr. Denney to initiate Drug Abuse treatment, at his own
expense; and
Mr. Denney to be under strictly supervised probation
for a period three (3) years.
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O0UNT* OP IRON, STATE GP UTAH

~

************
STATE OP UTAH JL
Plaintiff,

.- a - .k

Jtu

llj/lJMsA^mrfrJ

OBPUIY

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

V8.

LEON EARL DENNY

CASE NO. 1027

Defendant•
************

Upon reading the affidavit of J Lowe Barton, Probation Officer for Adult
Probation and Parole, of the State of Utah, asking that an Order to Show cause
be issued as to why the above-named Defandant should not have his probation
revoked and forthwith be committed to the Utah State Prison.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Defendant, named, be
>rdered and required to appear before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge of
he Fifth District Court at his courtroom located at 68 South 100 East,
arowan, Utah, at the hour of 9-*cAtf
t/\p+)f

on the )*$})•>

day

9 1988, then and there to show cause, if any, why the

robation of said Defendant should not be revoked by the Court and why the
lid Defendant should not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison.
»e Defendant is specifically informed, by this Order, that he has the right
be represented by counsel at the time of hearing; and if said Defendant
mot afford counsel, one shall be appointed for him by the Court. Moreover,
> Defendant is specifically informed that he has the right to present
dence at the hearing.
DATED THIS

\ 2 . % DAY OP

cud?

. 1988.

oouny OP IRON, STATE OP UTAH
**********

AFFIDAVIT
Case No.: 1027
State of gtah
Plaintiff
vs.
Leon Denny
Defendant
**********

STATE OF

OTAH

SS.

J Lowe Barton, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says: That he
is a District Agent for the Adult Probation and Parole Department; that on the
eighteenth day of September 1985 the above defendant was found guilty by jury
(or pleaded guilty) in the above court of (or to) the crime of Ottering a
forged prescription, a third degree felony and on March 20, 1986 was sentenced
to the term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for said crime;
Stay of execution was granted and the defendant was placed on probation
for a period of three years commencing on March 20, 1986. Be was further
ordered to enter into and abide by the conditions set forth in the Probation
Agreement, a copy of which is attached.
That the defendant did violate the terms and conditions of his probation
as follows, to-wit:
ALLEGATION #1: It is alleged that Mr. Denny is in violation of Condition 5 of
the Adult Probation & Parole Agreement, to-wit: 5 "I shall
obey all local, state and federal laws and municipal
ordinances at all times. I shall report any arrests or
citations to the Department of Corrections within 72 hours of
occurrence"; in that, on February 5, 1988 Mr. Denny entered a
plea of no contest to the charge of D.U.I, in Tonopah,
Nevada. A $650 fine was imposed. Mr. Denny was ordered to
serve 48 hours of community serviae in Cedar City.

RECEIVED APR 1 8 1938

PAGE 2
AFFIDAVIT
DBtfY, LEON EARL
ALLEGATION #2: It is alleged that Mr. Denny is in violation of Condition 5 of
the Adult Probation & Parole Agreement, to-wit:

5 *I shall

obey all state and federal lavs and municipal ordinances at
all times. I shall report any arrests or citations to the
Department of Corrections within 72 hours"; in that, on March
28, 1988 Mr. Denny was found to be in possession of two
financial transaction cards. One with the name Leon C.
Denning the other with the name L.C. Denning. At the time the
search of the residence was conducted on March 25, 1988
receipts indicating the use of these financial transaction
cards were found in Mr. Denny's business records.

It should

be noted that the names appearing on the financial transaction
cards are aliases previously known to have been used by Mr.
Denny. Possession of these cards is in violation of Utah Code
76-6-506.1 and 76-6-506.2.
ALLEGATION #3: It is alleged that Mr. Denny is violation Condition 5 of the
Adult Probation & Parole Agreement, to-wit: 5 "I shall obey
all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances at all
times.

I shall report any arrests or citations to the

Department of Corrections within 72 hours of occurrence." in
that, at the time Mr. Denny was cited for the D.U.I, noted
above, he did not report the arrest to the Office of Adult
Probation fc Parole within 72 hours of occurrence.
Investigating the situation it was also learned that Mr. Denny
was cited for a second D.U.I, offense in September of 1987.
However, this was later dismissed but was never reported to
the Office of Adult Probation & Parole in the 72 hour limit as
specified in the Adult Probation fc Parole Agreement.
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WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an order of the court issue directing
and requiring the defendant, above named, to be and appear before said Court
to show cause, if any he has why the aforesaid period of probation should not
be revoked, and why said defendant should not be forthwith committed to the
Utah State Prison.

SUBSCRIBED AND SHORN TO before me
this /2ik~'

day of Apr'6'

, 1988.

Notary residing at: Cedar city, UT 84720

ty commission expires: Yt6
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